CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 June 1994, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Satish Chandra (India)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 681st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I have on the list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of Egypt, Pakistan and Greece. I have great pleasure now in giving the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): It gives me pleasure to inform the Conference on Disarmament of the results of the eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement which was held in Cairo from 31 May to 3 June 1994. I would like to recall that the Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was attended by Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, who read out a message from the Secretary-General and delivered a statement before the Conference.

Part 5 of the final document of the Non-Aligned Movement's Ministerial Meeting was devoted to questions of disarmament and international security. The document addressed, inter alia, several issues that are of direct concern to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It was therefore important for the host country to inform this Conference of the contents of part 5 of that document and, on the basis of instructions from Cairo and in consultation with my colleagues, it is my pleasure to inform you thereof.

The final document reaffirmed the Non-Aligned Movement's belief that general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains an ultimate objective to be achieved and that a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced approach to the question of international security should be adopted. The Conference also once again emphasized the utmost priority which the Non-Aligned Movement accords to nuclear disarmament and to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference also urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate as a matter of priority an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Conference also stressed the need to set a target date for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and for the commencement of negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned Ministerial Conference urged the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority. The Ministerial Conference also urged nuclear-weapon States to suspend all test explosions pending the conclusion of that treaty. That part of the document relates to the work of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Concerning negative security assurances, which has a Committee within the Conference on Disarmament, the Non-Aligned Ministerial Meeting called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on the provisions of an international legally binding treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a final alternative the Conference also indicated that the adoption of a resolution within the Security Council providing for effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, through a ban on the use or threat of use of

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

such nuclear weapons, could positively contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although that did not constitute an alternative to an international treaty or convention in this respect.

The final document of the Conference also stipulated that the conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for purposes of the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons provided that such a convention was non-discriminatory, subject to effective verification and applicable on the universal scale.

Concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference called upon all the parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, pending the achievement of that aim, the Non-Aligned Conference called upon Israel to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The Conference commended the initiative launched by President Hosni Mubarak concerning the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and called for the implementation of that initiative.

In the field of chemical weapons, the Conference called upon all developed countries to adopt measures to promote the transfer of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and to remove all the existing unilateral restrictions of a discriminatory nature. With regard to the future of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Non-Aligned Conference called for a fresh appraisal of the fulfilment of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and expressed the hope that any pending issues relating to the Treaty would be dealt with, including the provision of acceptable security assurances and adequate technical assistance to all non-nuclear-weapon States in order to ensure the availability of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory, predictable and long-term basis.

Concerning conventional weapons, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement was of the opinion that the question of the stockpiling of conventional weapons exceeding the legitimate self-defence requirements of States should be sufficiently addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region. The Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement also addressed the question of export control regimes. In the final document the ministers expressed the objection of the Non-Aligned Movement to the continued functioning of export control regimes under the pretext of the non-proliferation of armaments, which could hamper the social and economic development of developing countries. The final document also reaffirmed the need for multilaterally negotiated universal and non-discriminatory disarmament agreements to address proliferation problems.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

The final document also addressed the international community's comprehensive evaluation of progress towards disarmament at the global level and, to that end, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement called for the convocation, at an appropriate time, of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be devoted to disarmament.

Mr. President, the Non-Aligned Movement, within the context of the rationalization of its work, sought to make its conclusions as brief as possible. Therefore, you find in what I have already stated only the main outline of the subjects addressed in part 5 of the document concerning disarmament and international security issues. The Egyptian delegation will be providing Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, with the full text of the final document in so far as it relates to disarmament and international security so that it can be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I intend to present Pakistan's policy views today on the subject of the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as on the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Both of these fall squarely in the domain of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and because that is the context in which we see them, I wish to refer briefly, in the first instance, to the initiatives and proposals that Pakistan has made over the years towards the objective of nuclear disarmament in general, and towards nuclear non-proliferation in our own region in particular. These proposals, to which we remain totally committed, include the following.

First, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which was mooted as early as 1972, and which has been endorsed repeatedly by the United Nations General Assembly since 1974. Second, a joint declaration between Pakistan and India renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, proposed in 1978. Third, an agreement with India on a system of bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis, proposed in 1979. Fourth, simultaneous acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards by Pakistan and India on all nuclear facilities, proposed in 1979. Fifth, Pakistan's readiness to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty simultaneously with India, proposed in 1979. Sixth, the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, proposed in 1987. Seventh, the convening of a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of regional and other interested States, proposed in 1987. Eighth, and finally, the holding of five-nation consultations to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, proposed in 1991.

I will now turn to the CTBT. My delegation has been following with great interest the ongoing debate on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as well as the consultations being conducted by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, on the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Pakistan has always supported United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We consider a universal and non-discriminatory CTBT as an important step towards halting the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby an important measure towards complete nuclear disarmament. A CTBT which does not achieve both of the two objectives would fail to halt the nuclear arms race.

Although we welcome the fact that after several years of concerted efforts, we have finally started negotiations on a CTBT, we are disappointed by the provisos put forward by some delegations for their continued participation in the negotiations.

To our surprise, exceptions have been requested for continued nuclear tests for safety purposes. Such demands would be unacceptable, as they would be against the very spirit of the treaty. Also they will leave the treaty open to exploitation and abuse. In our view, the best course would be to dismantle those nuclear weapons whose safety becomes doubtful, rather than testing them to verify their serviceability. Such a measure would indeed be a positive contribution to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Some delegations have linked their continued participation in the CTBT negotiations to the success of the NPT review and extension conference in early 1995. We feel that such linkages and conditions serve no purpose, and could only be detrimental to the negotiating process. The nuclear disarmament obligations of nuclear-weapons States are enshrined in numerous international documents, including the Final Document of SSOD-I, the threshold test-ban Treaty, as well as the NPT. These obligations need to be reaffirmed and pursued in good faith.

We agree that the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions contribute towards nuclear proliferation. However, this issue has no relationship with the question of the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We feel that nothing in the treaty should preclude the transfer and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Countries like Pakistan, which have scarce natural resources, will continue to rely on the development of nuclear technology for their energy needs.

There have been proposals in support of defining a nuclear test and the environment in which tests should be banned. We feel that such an approach will make the treaty vulnerable to abuse in the future. A broad definition, such as a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments for all times, would be most appropriate.

As regards the issue of whether "preparations" for a nuclear test should be banned under the treaty or not, we feel that this issue needs further consideration. Our preliminary assessment is that it will complicate the verification regime. Also, it may lead to allegations and counter-allegations, which could unnecessarily create friction and tension among countries. The CTBT is meant to ban nuclear testing. Adequate

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penalties in the treaty for violations should be sufficient to preclude complicated and possibly divisive provisions relating to preparations for testing.

As regards the verification regime, we are of the view that it should be cost-effective. As already proposed, a separate organization, co-located with IAEA in Vienna, would be preferable. The cost should be shared according to the United Nations scale of assessment.

It goes without saying that seismic monitoring should form the core of the verification regime, complemented by agreed non-seismic monitoring measures, as necessary.

The verification regime should be such that it promotes confidence among all States parties. It should not only be able to detect a rudimentary test by a newcomer, but also disguised nuclear tests like decoupled nuclear explosions.

In our view, all States parties to the treaty should be required to declare their nuclear test sites. States parties should also undertake to close their nuclear testing sites, and destroy testing equipment under their jurisdiction and control.

We agree with the contention that it is outside the purview of a CTBT to ban nuclear weapons. However, as one objective of the treaty is to curb vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would not be out of place to draw an inventory of all nuclear weapons held by the nuclear-weapon countries. This will ensure that no new nuclear weapons are introduced after the entry into force of the treaty. This measure is important in the light of the fact that it would be possible to develop new weapons, ostensibly through computer simulations, even after the entry into force of a CTBT.

The proposal that high-yield chemical explosions should be declared deserves further consideration. In our view, countries like Pakistan will find it difficult to provide advance notification of their high-yield chemical explosions due to the lack of a mechanism to monitor such activities.

On the question of entry into force, we feel that, at a minimum, all nuclear-weapon countries, and all those having nuclear research or power plants, should accede to the treaty before it comes into force.

It is in this context that I would like to briefly touch on the important issue of the expansion of the CD. In our view, a CTBT would not be truly universal in character if certain countries, most of whom have applied for the membership of the Conference, are kept out of the negotiating process. We also fear that the enforcement of a CTBT may become hostage to the expansion issue, given that some countries have linked the entry into force of the treaty to ratification by all members of an expanded CD. In our view, therefore, the expansion issue cannot be put off for long, as it may have

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serious ramifications. We hope that Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia, in his capacity as Friend of the Chair, would be able to resolve the issue soon, to the satisfaction of all concerned parties.

Having outlined Pakistan's standpoint on a CTBT, I would now like to turn to the question of the proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

Pakistan has welcomed President Clinton's proposal for a convention prohibiting the production of weapons-usable fissile material. Our support for the objectives underlying the convention, namely, the dual cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is historic as is manifest from our consistent support for the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the subject over the years.

Paragraph 50 (b) of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of SSOD-I calls for the "cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes".

Since 1978, when the disarmament priorities were spelled out in the Final Document, including a call for the cessation of fissionable materials for weapons, huge stocks of fissile materials were nevertheless produced at a high rate, leading to the present situation where the disposition and control of these materials has become a matter of serious international concern. It is, none the less, not too late to translate the vision of the Final Document into reality. The disarmament machinery established pursuant to SSOD-I, especially the Conference on Disarmament, is obligated to follow the priorities laid down in the Final Document. The negotiations at the CD should genuinely lead to meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation. Viewed in that context, a fissile cut-off convention which comprehensively addresses all aspects of the problem emanating from the production and stockpiling of fissile materials, and which enhances the security of all States, will be a major contribution to international peace and security.

Pakistan's endeavour at the CD would, therefore, be to negotiate, in a positive and constructive manner, a convention which leads to a universal, equitable and non-discriminatory regime covering fissile materials for weapons purposes, including a verifiable cessation of their production. We envisage no exception whatsoever under the proposed treaty.

Just like the chemical weapons Convention, which is a non-discriminatory treaty, this convention must firstly include a declaration by all States of weapons-grade fissile material stocks, and, secondly a schedule for the progressive transfer of these stocks to safeguards, so that the unsafeguarded stocks are "equalized" at the lowest possible level. Thus, a cut-off in the manufacture of fissile materials for weapons purposes must be accompanied by a binding programme for the elimination of asymmetry in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various States. The transfer should first be made by those States with the largest stockpiles, in the global and in the regional context.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

If this process of reducing unsafeguarded stockpiles is not accepted, the convention will make no impact on stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the evolving global situation provides us with an unprecedented opportunity to negotiate a just and equitable system of peace and security, a system which ensures security for all States, regardless of their size or strength.

While devising measures for arms control and disarmament, care has to be taken that the measures are non-discriminatory, that they create stability, that they are uniformly applicable to all States, that they create a balance of responsibility and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States, and that, until the objective of global disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon States are given unconditional and legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. BOUCAOURIS (Greece): Mr. President, this being the first time my delegation is taking the floor in the Conference this year, I wish you every success, which I am confident is certain, given your own personal skills and the experience, devotion and involvement of the Indian delegation which has always played one of the most important parts in the Conference.

I also take this opportunity to extend my warm congratulations both to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, and to the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail, whose competence and sense of duty are well known to all of us. By the same token I would like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by your predecessors, Ambassadors Boytha of Hungary, Hoffman of Germany and Errera of France.

New challenges are facing the Conference which has lived up to its tasks and reputation on chemical weapons. The main focus is now on nuclear weapons. At first sight a threefold problem (extension of the existing non-proliferation Treaty, conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and negative security assurances), it is in fact a multifaceted one and, as such, extremely complicated.

Still, the whole problem can be summed up in very simple terms: sadly, no watertight measures providing security guarantees from such weapons can be conceived or implemented. Indeed, contrary to the past, production or acquisition of fissionable material has become substantially easier over the years, worryingly at all possible levels.

This said, there is still much hope for one or more international legally binding regulations, whereby some minimum guarantees are supposed to be provided. In such a system the key issue is compliance of the signatories with provisions they have agreed to be bound by, which presupposes an efficient verification scheme, consisting of both routine and challenge inspections, which in turn means possible impingement on State sovereignty and acceptance thereof.

(Mr. Boucaouris, Greece)

If this matter is settled, the degree of security that can be obtained through an international convention varies with the degree of compromise reached on the verification-compliance issue. This, of course, is not the only problem. Cost-related issues are important, such as the cost of inspection methods, particularly as regards implementation of a CTBT. So are problems about the cost of keeping a long, permanent roster of inspectors. The Swedish idea of entrusting IAEA with the work is interesting and, to a certain extent, cost-effective. The main problem is that those determined to tamper with the rules on inspection will do so, whether the inspectors are national or international. All the more reason, then, to explore further the Swedish proposal.

Another point which should be highlighted regards the preparation for a conference in 1995 for the extension of the validity of the non-proliferation Treaty. Among the extension options my country supports an indefinite extension without any conditions attached, as the simplest and surest way to guarantee a further life of the Treaty without additional burden, legal or otherwise.

If nuclear weapons constitute the main concern of our work, they are unfortunately by no means the only one. A plethora of conventional weapons are proliferating at a dreadful speed, let alone the so-called inhuman weapons, indiscriminately killing or crippling devices, easy to get and hardly detectable at that. All this is more of a day-to-day problem than the nuclear weapons issue, and all of our countries have to cope with it. Certain encouraging moves are being made by some countries that have put an embargo on the export of such material. This does not suffice though.

The best possible results in the field of conventional weapons could be obtained through the implementation of provisions of resolutions 46/36 L and 47/52 L concerning the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, thus ensuring a minimum of badly needed transparency. My country is trying to do its utmost in this respect.

A recent Dutch proposal for a confidence-building measure on the global exchange of military information goes a step further, inasmuch as it concerns the organization, the structure and the size of armed forces, which is an extremely useful measure indeed. It draws on past experience, notably European, and presents similarities with an older British proposal of the same nature. Both proposals, however, call for completion, for they deal exclusively with the "static" element of armed forces, leaving aside the "dynamic" element, i.e. temporary transfer of armed forces for military drills which also should, to our mind, be subject to a certain regulation, preferably verifiable.

As to the setting up of a code of conduct, an additional transparency component, we support an Irish proposal but also find a lot of useful ideas in a recent Romanian paper and are ready to work constructively to achieve a tangible goal.

(Mr. Boucaouris, Greece)

On a regional scale, security and cooperation the Mediterranean is of capital importance for my country, having sponsored resolution 48/81 in the United Nations General Assembly on this issue. We believe that the riparian States, their differences notwithstanding, have much in common and widening their cooperation could only do good. Recent developments in the region cannot but encourage further moves in that direction.

Our interest in the Conference is witnessed by a long outstanding request for membership and active participation in several forums dealing with disarmament. Last year's selection left us out for no good reason at all. But we wish to renew our pledge to the Conference and our request for membership and hope that, in case a quick and felicitous solution were not obtained, then some other way of joining the work of the Conference could be found. On that the Conference proved to be quite imaginative, much to our pleasure.

May I make use today, albeit somewhat late, of my right of reply, to touch upon some points raised by Ambassador Calovski of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in his speech in the plenary three weeks ago? He referred to a series of measures taken by my country against his, charging Greece with the aim of destabilizing his country. May I recall, however, that Greece was the first to request international guarantees for the frontiers of the new country? Moreover it was not the European Union, as was wrongly stated, but the Commission of the European Communities that brought the matter before the Court, where the case is still pending, so it is rather early to talk about condemnation. Several imaginary cases were mentioned of blockades against land-locked countries. There again I will retort that several other, real cases, of a similar nature, including land-locked countries, have existed in the past and some are still in force. Which means that the measure is not unique to be singled out in such a way.

I am glad to notice that Ambassador Calovski's conclusions were positive: a wish for friendly relations between the two countries, a wish that we too unreservedly share. Still, if I am not in the least questioning his sincerity, allow me to add just this: those willing to build up good relations do not tolerate or instigate the printing of maps like the one attached as an annex to my statement [map distributed to delegations]. According to our information not only do they do so, but they also put this map at the disposal of schoolchildren to be used in education. There you can seen the geographical region of Macedonia as a whole, its boundaries drawn in a way to include a large chunk of Greece of the same name. I feel then entitled to ask: if generations are being taught such things, can you still call this a willingness to promote a friendly climate?

I am sorry to keep you busy with comments like this, which I have to admit are somehow irrelevant to the work of our Conference. It is nevertheless no less irrelevant than the initial comments, in reply to which it is being done.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Greece for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Mrs. TASEVSKA (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): I regret that the representative of the Republic of Greece considered it necessary to use this meeting for presenting matters which do not refer to the facts and take unnecessary time of this meeting. Under Security Council resolution 817 (1993), and the relevant statement of the President of the Security Council, my delegation is fully entitled to use the constitutional name of our country, which is "the Republic of Macedonia". In accordance with the mentioned Security Council resolution, one can refer, if one wishes to do so, to our country using the language inscribed on the plate in front of me, but that is a technical reference and not the name of my country, which is "the Republic of Macedonia". The representative of Greece omitted to mention that the embargo of his Government against my country has been universally condemned and there is no ground, whatsoever, for its justification. The sooner it is annulled, the better for both countries. It is widely known that we would like to develop the best possible relations with Greece, based on mutual interest and respect. We would like to enter that period without any delay.

Mr. BOUCAOURIS (Greece): Not wanting to abuse precious time, I would just say that a few days ago, a big shipment of medicines was channelled from the port of Saloniki to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any other speakers at this stage? I see none.

I would just like to make a brief comment in my capacity as the representative of India, and I would just like to state that we have heard with great interest the statement made by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, including, inter alia, the references that were made to the propcsals vis-à-vis India. The rationale for our reactions to these proposals are well known, our own initiatives and proposals are also well known, and will be reiterated in the CD at a suitable date.

Are there any other speakers? If not, we can proceed with the remainder of business. I would like to now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I propose that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. However, before doing so, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by a meeting of Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in this room.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held as scheduled on Thursday, 16 June 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.